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Financial Development and Innovation: Cross Country Evidence 
 
 
 
 
We provide cross-country evidence to examine how financial market development affects 
innovation. Using a large data set including 34 developed as well as emerging countries, we 
differentiate the impacts of equity market and credit market development on a country’s 
innovation productivity measured by patenting. We show that, while the development of equity 
markets encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. A rich set of 
tests shows that the baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We 
further examine the effect of financial development on innovation making use of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in countries’ economic development degrees and investor protections. We find that 
the effect of financial development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries and 
in countries with stronger shareholder protection and weaker creditor protection. Our evidence is 
robust to alternative proxies for financial development and innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is vital for a country’s long-run economic growth and competitive advantage. 
As suggested in Porter (1992), “To compete effectively in international markets, a nation’s 
businesses must continuously innovate and upgrade their competitive advantages. Innovation and 
upgrading come from sustained investment in physical as well as intangible assets.” Financial 
markets play critical roles in mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring 
managers, and facilitating transactions. Therefore the development of financial markets is critical 
for a nation’s innovation (Schumpeter, 1911). Although there is a large economics and finance 
literature establishing a strong link between financial development and economic growth, 
empirical studies of channels through which finance affects growth is relatively sparse. The 
objective of this paper is to fill the gap by identifying a channel, i.e., innovation, and providing 
cross-country evidence to empirically examine the impact of financial development on 
innovation. Furthermore, we differentiate the impacts of equity market and credit market 
development on innovation. 
 Our basic hypothesis is that credit market and equity market development have different 
impacts on innovation. As pointed out by Holmstrom (1989), innovation activities involve a very 
high probability of failure and the whole innovation process is long, idiosyncratic, and 
unpredictable with many future contingencies that are hard to foresee. Therefore, different 
natures of credit and equity markets may have different influences on encouraging innovation 
due to different payoff structures to equity and credit providers. We thus hypothesize that, while 
equity market development encourages innovation, credit market development impedes 
innovation.  
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As suggested by the existing literature, credit markets may discourage innovation. Stiglitz 
(1985) suggests that the structure of a debt contract is not well suited for innovative firms with 
uncertain and volatile returns. Hellwig (1991) and Rajan (1992) argue that powerful banks 
frequently stifle innovation by extracting informational rents and protecting established firms. By 
acquiring inside information about the firm, powerful banks can extract informational rents and a 
large share of the profits from firms, which reduces firms’ incentives to undertake invest in long-
run innovative projects. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) further 
suggest that credit markets have an inherent bias toward conservative investments, which 
discourages firms from investing in innovative projects and leads them to be more willing to shut 
down ongoing ones.   
In contrast, equity markets give firms more discretion to invest in innovative technologies 
and therefore firms have stronger incentive to pursue uncertain but potentially breakthrough 
innovations. As discussed in Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Brown, Martinsson, and 
Petersen (2010), equity markets have several advantages relative to credit markets when 
encouraging innovation. First, unlike bondholders, shareholders share upside returns when 
innovation turns out to be successful. Second, unlike debt financing, there are no collateral 
requirements for equity financing, which is especially valuable for innovative firms because 
these firms typically have large intangible assets with limited collateral value. Third, firms’ 
exposures to financial distress do not increase with additional equity financing, which is valuable 
for firms investing in innovations.  
We collect innovation and financial development data for 34 economies from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Report, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), and the World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (WDI/GDF) 
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databases. Our sample includes both developed countries such as U.S., U.K., and Japan and 
emerging nations like China, India, and Brazil. To address concerns regarding endogeneity in 
financial development and short panel data with auto-correlated variables, we use the Arellano-
Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure in our baseline estimation (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
Our baseline analysis suggests that a nation’s equity market development (measured by 
the nation’s stock market capitalization normalized by GDP) is positively and significantly 
associated with its subsequent growth in industry-level innovation. Specifically, increasing a 
country’s stock market capitalization by one standard deviation increases its growth in 
innovation in the following year (measured by the number of filed patents) by 3.01~5.78%. 
However, a country’s credit market development (measured by its domestic credit to private 
sectors normalized by GDP) is negatively associated with its subsequent growth in industry-level 
innovation. Our evidence suggests that increasing a nation’s credit to private sectors by one 
standard deviation results in a decrease in its innovation growth rate in the following year by 
3.47~5.62%.  
While our baseline results support the hypothesis that equity market development 
encourages innovation and credit market development impedes innovation, an important concern 
is endogeneity in financial development, which arises because of both reverse causality and 
omitted variables concerns. First, there is an old debate on the direction of causality between 
finance and growth (e.g., Schumpeter, 1911; and Robinson, 1952). Although our evidence 
obtained from the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure seems to suggest that financial development 
leads to innovation, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the causality flowing goes 
from innovation to financial development. For example, one may argue that economies with 
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good innovation prospects develop financial markets to provide the funds necessary to support 
those good innovation prospects. Then, innovation leads, and finance follows. Second, omitted 
variables problem may also bias our estimation. Unobservable industry/country characteristics 
related to both financial development and innovation growth are put in the residual term of the 
regressions, which biases the estimation and makes statistical inferences hard to draw. Although 
including country fixed effects in our baseline regression can largely mitigate the omitted 
variables problem when unobservables are constant over time, endogeneity is still a concern if 
unobservables are time-varying.  
To address the endogeneity concern, we take two different approaches. We start with 
Granger causality (Granger, 1969) to address the reverse causality problem. Granger causality is 
an empirical approach to investigate causal effects between time series and has been widely 
studied and applied in macroeconomics. We find financial development Granger-cause 
innovation, because a previous increase in financial development is associated with a subsequent 
increase in innovation but a previous change in innovation is not associated with subsequent 
change in financial development. Since the concerns and caveats of Granger causality are well 
understood, we further address the endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable (IV) 
approach. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and Levine (2002), we use the legal 
origin and the religious composition of countries as the IVs for the level of financial 
development. The first-stage regressions of the two-stage least squares (TSLS) regression 
suggest that the IVs are statistically significantly related to financial development variables and 
therefore satisfy the relevance condition. In the second-stage regressions, our baseline results 
continue to hold, suggesting that the relation between financial development and innovation 
cannot be simply attributed to omitted variables. The evidence from the two approaches 
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addressing endogeneity issues suggests that there exists a causal effect of financial development 
on innovation.      
We then further examine the impact of financial development on innovation relying on 
the cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries’ investor protections and economic development 
degrees. First, we find that the positive impact of equity market development on innovation is 
stronger in countries with higher shareholder protection and the negative impact of credit market 
development on innovation is stronger in countries with weaker creditor protection. Our 
evidence suggests that stronger protection for investors mitigates the agency problem between 
firm managers and investors, which encourages innovation. Second, we show that the positive 
(negative) impact of equity (credit) market development on innovation is stronger in emerging 
countries than developed countries. Our evidence suggests that relative to developed countries, 
equity markets play a leading role fostering innovation in emerging countries due to 
insufficiency and inefficiency of these countries’ private sector’s technology investment. 
Meanwhile, since the development of credit markets in emerging nations to some extent reflects 
the risk aversion of these countries’ investors, a more developed credit market discourages risky 
investments in innovation to a greater degree.  
We check the robustness of our findings by constricting alternative proxies and 
alternative samples. First, we construct alternative proxies for financial development as well as 
innovation. Our baseline results remain unchanged. Second, besides our baseline setup that is 
based on country-industry-year observations, we redo all analyses in an alternative sample that is 
based on country-year observations. The sample size is substantially smaller (which largely 
reduces the power of our tests), but we find both quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. 
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Our paper makes contributions to two streams of literature. The primary contribution is to 
the literature on motivating innovation. There is a fast growing literature, both theoretically and 
empirically, examining how to promote innovation. Holmstrom (1989), in a simple principle-
agent model, shows that innovation activities may mix poorly with routine activities in an 
organization.  Manso (2010) develops a model and argues that managerial contracts that provide 
tolerance for failure in the short run and reward for success in the long run are best suited for 
motivating innovation. The model in Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2010) shows that private 
instead of public ownership spurs innovation. Empirical evidence using U.S. data shows that 
laws (Fan and White, 2003; and Acharya and Subramanian, 2009), corporate governance (Sapra, 
Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2009; and Chemmanur and Tian, 2010), capital structure 
(Atannassov, Nanda, and Seru, 2007), stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2010), product 
market competition (Aghion et al., 2005), investors’ attitude towards failure (Tian and Wang, 
2010), and institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2009) all affect 
innovation.  
The only paper we are aware of that examines the determinants of firm innovation using 
international data is Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2010). Using manager survey 
data from 47 emerging countries, they show that more innovative firms are large exporting firms 
characterized by private ownership, highly educated managers with mid-level managerial 
experience, and access to external finance. Unlike their paper that focuses on emerging countries 
and uses firm-level survey data, our paper uses data including both emerging and developed 
countries and studies the different impacts of equity and credit market development on 
innovation at the aggregate level. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper that shows while 
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the development of equity market encourages innovation, credit market development restrains 
innovation in an international setting. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on finance and growth. Starting from 
Schumpeter (1911) and Robinson (1952), a large literature has been developed to understand the 
relationship between financial systems and growth. Recent theoretical developments have 
indicated two likely linkages between finance and growth. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and 
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) argue that financial markets can matter by affecting the volume of 
savings available to financial investment, while Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and 
Levine (1993a) suggest that financial markets matter by increasing the productivity of 
investment. Following above theoretical work, empirical evidence linking finance and growth 
goes back to Goldsmith (1969) and Shaw (1973). More recently, research has shown that the size 
and depth of an economy’s financial system positively affect its future growth in per capital, real 
income, employment, and output (e.g., King and Levine, 1993b; Jayarathe and Strahan, 1996; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Beck and 
Levine, 2002; and Black and Strahan, 2002). Our contribution to this literature is that we identify 
a specific channel, i.e., innovation, through which finance affects economic growth.  
The closest related paper in this stream of literature to ours is Brown, Fazzari, and 
Petersen (2009). They argue that the financing of R&D is a channel that links finance and 
growth, and show significant effects of cash flow and external equity on R&D for young, but not 
mature firms. Our paper differs from theirs in a couple of dimensions. First, we directly examine 
the effect of financial development on patents that reflect successful and realized R&D 
investments. Second, instead of using U.S. firm level data, we rely on cross-country aggregate 
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level data that allow us to differentiate the impacts of credit and equity market development on 
innovation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss data collection and 
variable construction, and provide descriptive statistics. Section 3 reports our empirical results 
and discusses the main findings. Section 4 shows cross-sectional analysis, and Section 5 
concludes this paper. Detailed discussions on variable definitions and dynamic panel data model 
estimation are given in the appendix. 
 
2. Data 
We construct our main innovation measure based on the number of patents approved by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We measure the innovation growth of industry j 
in country i in year t as follows:  
 IndustryTechj,i,t = ln(1 + Patentj,i,t) – ln(1 + Patentj,i,t-1),                                              (1) 
where Patentj,i,t measures the number of granted patents in industry j from country i in year t. We 
use the patent data of the USPTO for two reasons: First, due to the territorial principle in U.S. 
patent laws, any person intending to claim exclusive rights for inventions is required to file U.S. 
patents. Since the U.S. is the biggest technology consumption market in the world over the past 
few decades, it is reasonable to assume that all important inventions from other countries have 
been patented in the U.S. Second, the USPTO adopts a reasonably detailed classification system, 
3-digit technology classes, in classifying all U.S. patents.1 Thus, annual country-industry-level 
patent counts (Patentj,i,t) are actually defined as the number of successful patent applications that 
are classified in the j-th class of 3-digit technology classes and are filed by the residents (patent 
                                                           
1
 There are total 462 groups in the 3-digit technology classes. The detailed definition is available at:  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm. 
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assignees) of country i in year t, which are collected by the updated NBER patent database.2 
These patents are successful innovation as they are later granted by the USPTO. That database is 
originally established by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and contains detailed information of 
all patents approved by the USPTO over the period 1976-2006. 
For robustness, we also construct a country-level proxy using a different data source to 
measure the innovation growth of country i in year t as follows:  
 CountryTechi,t = ln(1 + Patenti,t) – ln(1 + Patenti,t-1),                                                   (2) 
where Patenti,t denotes the number of patents owned by the residents of country i in year t. To 
measure Patenti,t, we use the number of country i residents’ worldwide patent applications filed 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or to country i’s national patent office in year t, 
available from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Patent Report.3 Unlike the 
NBER patent database that provides information on patent applications that are eventually 
granted in the U.S., the WIPO database provides information on the number of patent 
applications in each country. The available sample period of the WIPO database starts from 1985 
and ends in 2005. 
Some issues about our proxies of innovation are worth discussing: First, using U.S. patent 
data to measure cross-country innovation performance has been widely adopted in the literature 
(e.g., Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen, 1999; Griffith, Harrison, and Van Reenen, 2006; and 
Acharya and Subramanian, 2009). Second, we calculate annual country-industry patent counts 
Patentj,i,t and annual country patent counts Patenti,t based on the patent application year, as 
inventions start to affect real economy since their inception. As suggested in Hall, Jaffe, and 
                                                           
2
 The updated NBER patent database is available at: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home. 
3
 The data of the WIPO Patent Report are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database and Global Development Finance (GDF) database at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog. 
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Trajtenberg (2005, P.410), “Thus, and whenever possible, the application date should be used as 
the relevant time placer for patents.”  
We include a total of 34 economies in our sample: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., 
and U.S. 4  Our sample includes a wide arrange of countries, both developed and emerging 
economies. 
Country-level economic variables of these 34 economies are collected from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (WDI/GDF) database on annual basis. 
The economic variables include GDP, stock market capitalization, stock market traded value, 
domestic credit to private sectors, aggregate R&D expenditure, import value, export value, and 
liquid liability (M3) for each sample country in each year during the period of 1976-2006. 
Moreover, we collect each country’s annual economic freedom scores constructed by the Wall 
Street Journal and Heritage Foundation.5  
In the existing literature, a country’s overall financial development is measured by the 
ratio of domestic credit plus stock market capitalization to GDP (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). Since our goal is to understand how stock market development and credit market 
development differently influence a country’s innovation productivity, we construct two separate 
empirical proxies. Following the existing literature (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; 
                                                           
4
 Among 35 top-ranked foreign economies with patent records in the USPTO 
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/o_ces/ac/ido/oeip/taf/apat.htm), 33 are selected into our sample. Taiwan is not 
included in our sample because relevant statistics are not available from the WDI/GDF database. 
Czechoslovakia is not included in our sample as it has been separated into the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic in 1993. 
5
 The economic freedom scores are available at: http://www.heritage.org/index/. 
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Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000; Beck and Levine, 2002; and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2007), our proxy for stock market development of country i in year t is  
 MKTi,t = ln(Stock Market Capitalizationi,t / GDPi,t),                                                        (3) 
 i.e., the natural logarithmic ratio of country i’s stock market capitalization in year t over its GDP 
in the same year. The proxy for credit market development of country i in year t is  
 CREDITi,t = ln(Private Crediti,t / GDPi,t),                                                                        (4) 
 i.e., the natural logarithmic ratio of country i’s domestic credit to private sectors in year t over 
its GDP in the same year. Domestic credit to private sectors includes domestic credit through 
loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable. For 
robustness, we also consider the natural logarithmic ratio of all bank credits to GDP as an 
alternative proxy for credit market development. Since the alternative proxy provides test results 
similar to those of the primary one, they are omitted in the context in the interest of brevity. 
We also include other economic variables that may affect innovation growth in our 
empirical analysis: (1) aggregate R&D growth, R&Di,t, which is defined as the natural 
logarithmic value of country i’s aggregate R&D expenditure in year t minus the natural 
logarithmic value of its aggregate R&D expenditure in year  t – 1, i.e.  ln(R&Di,t) – ln(R&Di,t-1);6 
(2) stock market turnover, Turnoveri,t, which is the natural logarithmic ratio of country i’s stock 
market traded value over its stock market capitalization in year t; (3) GDP growth, GDPi,t, 
which is defined as country i’s natural logarithmic GDP in year t minus its natural logarithmic 
GDP in year t – 1; (4) Economic openness, Opennessi,t, which is  the natural logarithmic ratio of 
country i’s import plus export over its GDP in year t, i.e. ln[(Importi,t + Exporti,t-1) / GDPi,t]; (5) 
Liquid liability (King and Levine, 1993b), M3i,t, which is defined as country i’s M3 over its GDP 
in year t, i.e., ln(M3i,t / GDPi,t); (6) Economic freedom, Freedomi,t, which is country i’s overall 
                                                           
6
 Unlike patents, all 34 countries have non-zero reported R&D expenses in the sample period. Therefore, 
when taking the natural logarithmic transform, we do not add one to R&D expenses. 
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economic freedom score in year t. Detailed definitions of variables used in the following 
analyses are provided in Appendix A.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables. The top panel of Table 1 shows the 
summary statistics of variables. Industrial innovation growth (IndustryTech) has a mean value 
of 0.007 with a standard deviation of 0.543, while country-level innovation growth 
(CountryTech) has a mean value of 0.028 and a standard deviation of 0.227. Both innovation 
growth measures are negatively auto-correlated, suggesting a reasonable mean-reversion in 
technological progress. Stock market development (i.e., MKT) and credit market development 
(i.e., CREDIT) have mean values of –0.720 and –0.551 with standard deviations of 1.204 and 
0.694, respectively. Their negative mean values are attributed to the logarithmic linearization. 
Not surprisingly, both financial development measures are highly auto-correlated (i.e., 0.709 and 
0.948, respectively), mainly due to slow evolution of economic systems. Both aggregate GDP 
and R&D reveal steady growth: they increase by 4.7% and 3.8% on average per year, with 
standard deviations of 7.0% and 3.5% and autocorrelation coefficients of 0.403 and 0.330, 
respectively. Stock market turnover (i.e., Turnover), economic openness (i.e., Openness), and 
liquid liability (i.e., M3) have mean values of –0.833, –2.648, and –0.547 with standard 
deviations of 1.007, 1.484, and 0.541, respectively. Again, the negative mean values are due to 
the logarithmic linearization. Finally, an average country has an economic freedom index (i.e., 
Freedom) of 67.924 with a standard deviation of 10.091. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the correlation coefficient among country-level 
innovation and other economic variables. We find that country-level innovation correlates with 
financial development variables: The correlation coefficient between CountryTech and MKT is 
0.141 (p-value = 0.012), while the correlation coefficient between CountryTech and CREDIT is 
13 
 
0.091 (p-value = 0.106). Not surprisingly, R&D and GDP are two economic variables that 
have the highest correlation coefficients with CountryTech (0.204 and 0.192, respectively) with 
statistical significance because ∆R&D captures the necessary input of innovation and GDP 
reflects the size of an economy. Economic openness and freedom are two economic variables 
that have the lowest correlation coefficients with CountryTech (0.012 and 0.041, respectively), 
both without statistical significance. These statistics suggest that innovation growth is related to 
many aspects of the economy and call for further analysis with appropriate econometric methods. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 In this section, we present our empirical tests and discuss the main findings of the paper. 
We start with presenting model specification and estimation in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, we 
report our baseline results based on country-industry-level analysis. In Section 3.3, we discuss 
our identification strategy and present empirical tests dealing with endogeneity concerns. We 
provide robustness check results with country-level analysis in Section 3.4 and with alternative 
proxies for innovation growth in Section 3.5. 
 
3.1. Model specification and estimation 
To investigate the effect of financial development on country-industry-level innovation 
growth, we estimate the following model:7  
IndustryTechj,i,t =   +  IndustryTechj,i,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 
+ Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Industryj + 
Countryi + Yeart + ej,i,t.                                                                                    (5) 
                                                           
7
 Following the previous literature (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; and Acharya and Subramanian, 2009), 
our baseline specification is to regress country-industry-level innovation variables on country-level 
financial market development as well as economic variables. .  
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where IndustryTechj,i,t-1 is the lagged value of IndustryTechj,i,t, Industryj denotes industry 
dummies, Countryi denotes country dummies, Yeart denotes year dummies, and all other 
country-level economic variables are the same as we describe in Section 2. 
It is well known that the traditional least squares dummy variable (LSDV) method is 
biased in the above dynamic panel data models with individual effects. To address this potential 
bias, we adopt the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure following Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) 
for the country-industry-year panel (Equation (5)). The dynamic panel is estimated using the 
one-step GMM system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; and Blundell and Bond, 1998), 
which employs two moment conditions to jointly estimate the regressions in transforms of the 
variables and regressions in levels. Following the existing literature  (e.g., Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; and Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000), we use the past 
three available lagged regressors as instruments in “transformed regressions” and one lagged 
transforms of regressors in “level regressions.” Detailed procedures of dynamic panel data model 
estimation are discussed in Appendix B.  
 
3.2. Baseline results 
Table 2 reports the GMM system estimation results of estimating Equation (5). The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by country-industry. It shows the results of our baseline regressions of country-industry-level 
analysis, in which the dependent variable is patent growth in each industry in each country. The 
coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 and CREDITi,t-1 are 0.025 (t-statistic = 1.98) and –0.050 (t-
statistic = –2.13), respectively, in the basic model setting (column (1)), in which we include only 
lagged innovation, stock market development, credit market development, industry dummies, 
country dummies, and year dummies in the regression. The results suggest that increasing a 
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country’s stock market capitalization by one standard deviation increases its industry-level 
innovation growth by 3.01%, while increasing its credit to private sector by one standard 
deviation decreases its industry-level innovation growth by 3.47%.8 In the second specification, 
we add R&D growth, stock market turnover, and GDP growth to the regression. The coefficient 
estimate of MKTi,t-1 continues to be positive and significant and the magnitude rises to 0.048 (t-
statistic = 4.37). The coefficient estimate of CREDITi,t-1  is still negative and significant, and the 
magnitude drops to –0.081 (t-statistic = –4.52). In the complete model setting in which economic 
openness, liquid liability, and economic freedom are all included, we find that the coefficient 
estimates of MKTi,t-1 and CREDITi,t-1  are 0.045 (t-statistic = 3.14) and –0.059 (t-statistic = –
1.75), respectively. Based on the coefficient estimates reported in the complete model in column 
(3), increasing a country’s stock market capitalization by one standard deviation increases its 
industry-level innovation growth by 5.42%, while increasing the country’s credit to private 
sector by one standard deviation results in a decrease in its industry-level innovation growth by 
4.10%. The evidence reported in this panel provides support for our hypothesis that while stock 
market development has a positive effect on innovation, credit market development negatively 
affects innovation. 
As reported in Table 2, we also show that R&D growth, GDP growth, and liquid liability 
are positively related to industry-level innovation growth, which are consistent with economic 
intuition and existing literature. In addition, economic openness and freedom also are positively 
related to industry-level innovation growth. Lagged industry-level innovation does not appear to 
explain current industry-level innovation once other variables are controlled. Our sample size 
                                                           
8
 As reported in Table 1, the standard deviations of MKT and CREDIT are 1.204 and 0.694, respectively. 
Thus, the one standard deviation increase in MKT and CREDIT leads to 1.204×2.5% = 3.01% and 
0.694×–5.0% = –3.47% in innovation, respectively. 
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varies across different model specifications due to the availability of explanatory variables 
included in the regressions.  
 
3.3. Identification 
While our baseline results support the hypothesis that equity market development 
encourages innovation and credit market development impedes innovation, an important concern 
is endogeneity in financial development. The endogeneity concern arises mainly due to both 
reverse causality and omitted variables problem. In this section, we take two different 
approaches to address the identification issue. 
 
3.3.1. Granger causality 
We start with addressing the reverse causality problem. As we discussed in the 
introduction, there is an old debate on the direction of causality between finance and growth 
(e.g., Schumpeter, 1911 and Robinson, 1952). Although the Arellano-Bond GMM procedure 
takes endogeneity in financial development into account by using lagged regressors as 
instruments, we still cannot completely rule out the possibility that innovation drives up 
contemporaneous financial development as well as future innovation, which results in a lead-lag 
relation between financial development and innovation. Such argument, however, is not 
supported by our data because both IndustryTech and CountryTech are negatively auto-
correlated as reported in Table 1.  
Another possible reverse-causality situation is that economies with good innovation 
prospects develop financial markets to provide the funds necessary to support those good 
innovation prospects. Then, innovation leads, and finance follows. To address the reverse 
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causality, we first use Granger causality (Granger, 1969) by estimating the following models for 
the country-year panel:  
MKTi,t = c0 + c1 CountryTechi,t-1 + c2 MKTi,t-1 + c3 CREDITi,t-1 + c4 R&Di,t-1 
+ c5 Turnoveri,t-1 + c6 GDPi,t-1+ c7 Opennessi,t-1+ c8 M3i,t-1 + c9 Freedomi,t-1 
+ Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t,                                                                                     (6) 
CREDITi,t = d0 + d1 CountryTechi,t-1 + d2 MKTi,t-1 + d3 CREDITi,t-1 + d4 R&Di,t-1 
+ d5 Turnoveri,t-1 + d6 GDPi,t-1+ d7 Opennessi,t-1+ d8 M3i,t-1 
+ d9 Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart +  εi,t,                                                 (7) 
where ei,t and εi,t denote the error terms.9  
We report the regression results in Table 3. In Panel A where MKTi,t is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient estimates of CountryTechi,t-1  range from –0.037 to –0.016 and none of 
them is statistically significant. The coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1, however, are positive and 
significant at the 1% level, being consistent with our earlier findings of high autocorrelation of 
MKT as reported in Table 1. Among all other economic variables, GDP growth negatively 
predicts MKTi,t , while economic freedom is able to positively predict MKTi,t. In Panel B where 
CREDITi,t is the dependent variable, the coefficient estimates of CountryTechi,t-1 in all three 
columns are negative but not statistically significant. However, the coefficient estimates of 
CREDITi,t-1 are positive and  significant at the 1% level, being consistent with our earlier 
findings on the persistent credit market development as reported in Table 1. Moreover, stock 
market development and economic freedom positively forecast CREDITi,t, while liquid liability 
negatively forecasts CREDITi,t. Overall, the evidence suggests that innovation does not appear to 
forecast financial development. 
                                                           
9
 We conduct the Granger causality test in the country-level sample because the dependent variables, MKTi,t and 
CREDITi,t are aggregate measures at the country level. Therefore, it is more appropriate to examine if the lagged 
country-level innovation variables are able to predict the country-level financial development variables. The results 
are quantitatively unchanged if we use the lagged country-industry-level innovation variable, IndustryTechj,i,t-1, in 
the Granger causality test. 
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Taken together, the Granger causality tests suggest that a previous increase in financial 
development is associated with a subsequent increase in innovation, but a previous change in 
innovation is not associated with subsequent change in financial development. Our evidence 
hence suggests that financial development Granger-causes innovation.  
 
3.3.2. Instrumental variable approach   
Endogeneity in financial development may be also due to the omitted variables problem. 
Unobservable characteristics that affect both financial development and innovation may bias our 
coefficient estimates and make the interpretation of our results difficult. Although we include 
country fixed effects in our baseline regressions that largely mitigate the omitted variables 
problem if country unobservables are time-invariant, endogeneity is still an issue if 
unobservables are time-varying. Thus, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck and 
Levine (2002), we conduct cross-country two-stage least squares (TSLS) analysis using two sets 
of instruments: legal origins and religious compositions.  
The first set of instruments is a country’s legal origin. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) show that a country’s legal system (English, French, German, 
or Scandinavian system) influences its domestic capital market development. Therefore, it 
satisfies the relevance condition of IVs. Moreover, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
and Beck and Levine (2002), since most countries have acquired their legal systems through 
occupation and colonialism, a country’s legal origin can be regarded as exogenous and therefore 
is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction of IVs. The second set of instruments is a country’s 
religious composition. A country’s religious composition represents the fractions of Catholics, 
Muslims, and Protestants in its population (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1999), and it has been used as the IVs for financial sector development in Beck and Levine 
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(2002). Similar to legal origins, since a country’s religious composition is determined due to 
historical reasons, it reasonably satisfies the exclusion restriction of IVs.  To examine the validity 
of the constructed IVs in the TSLS regressions, we conduct the Sargan-Hansen J test. 
Following previous literature (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Levine, Loayza, and 
Beck, 2000; and Beck and Levine, 2002), we first compute the time series averages of all 
economic variables to construct a cross-section of country-industry sample. In the first stage, we 
regress MKTi or CREDITi (i.e., the time series averages of MKTi,t and CREDITi,t) on the IVs (as 
well as other control variables). In the second stage, we regress IndustryTechj,i (i.e., the time 
series averages of IndustryTechj,i,t) on the predicted MKTi and CREDITi from the first-stage 
regressions (as well as other control variables).  We report the regression results in Table 4. 
The top panel reports the F-statistics for the joint significance of IVs from the first-stage 
regressions. The values of F-statistics are much larger than the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test 
critical values. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The weak 
instrument test ensures that the coefficient estimates and their corresponding estimated standard 
errors reported in the TSLS regressions are likely to be unbiased and the inferences based on 
them would be reasonably valid.   
The bottom panel of table 4 reports the second-stage regression results. We continue to 
observe positive and significant coefficient estimates of MKTi in all three columns, being 
consistent with our baseline findings that equity market development encourages innovation. The 
coefficient estimates of CREDITi are negative in all three columns and statistically significant in 
the complete model (column (3)), being reasonably consistent with our baseline findings that 
credit market development impedes innovation. The insignificant Sargan-Hansen J-statistics for 
the validity of the IVs in columns (2) and (3) suggest that our instruments are reasonably valid. 
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Overall, the TSLS regression results reported in Table 4 suggest that the effect of financial 
market development on innovation is unlikely driven by unobservable country or industry 
heterogeneity.   
In summary, the identification tests reported in this subsection reasonably suggest that 
our baseline results are robust to endogeneity in financial development, and there exists a causal 
relationship between equity and credit market development and innovation growth.     
 
3.4. Country-level  panel analysis 
For robustness, we construct an alternative sample in which the innovation variable, 
CountryTechi,t is based on country-level observations. We estimate the following model to 
examine if our baseline findings regarding the effect of financial development on innovation 
growth still hold:  
CountryTechi,t =   + CountryTechi,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + 
Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + 
Yeart + ei,t,                       (8) 
where CountryTechi,t-1 is the lagged value of CountryTechi,t, and all other economic variables 
are the same as those in Equation (5).  
Table 5 reports the GMM system estimation results of estimating Equation (8). The t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
by country. The sample size drops dramatically relative to that in Table 2, which reduces the 
power of our tests.  
Being consistent with our baseline evidence reported in Table 2, the coefficient estimates 
of MKTi,t-1 continue to be positive and significant and those of CREDITi,t-1 are negative and 
significant. For example, as reported in column (3), the coefficient estimate of MKTi,t-1 is 0.028 
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(t-statistic = 2.06) and that of CREDITi,t-1 is –0.047 (t-statistic = –2.40). Although the estimations 
are based on a much smaller sample, which may substantially reduce the power of our tests, the 
magnitudes and significance levels of coefficient estimates of MKTi,t  and CREDITi,t closely 
mirror those of our baseline regressions reported in Table 2.  
Consistent with our earlier findings, R&D growth, GDP growth, and liquid liability are 
positively related to the country’s innovation growth. Moreover, stock market turnover is 
positively related to future innovation, while economic openness and freedom do not appear to 
explain innovation growth. The negative coefficient estimates of lagged innovation growth 
confirm the mean-reverting process in technology progress as we show in Table 1. Due to the 
availability of explanatory variables, the sample size varies across different specifications. 
 
3.5. Alternative proxies of innovation 
For robustness, in addition to alternative sample, we construct two alternative proxies for 
innovation growth: the growth in high-tech exports and the growth of scientific and technical 
journal articles. We then examine the effects of financial development on innovation growth 
measured by these two proxies. The growth in high-tech exports of country i in year t is 
constructed as follows:  
 HiTechExporti,t = ln(1 + HiTechExporti,t) – ln(1 + HiTechExporti,t-1),                        (9) 
where HiTechExporti,t is the current US dollars of high-tech exports, including exporting high 
R&D intensity products such as aerospace-related, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific 
instruments, and electrical machinery, of country i in year t. The growth in scientific and 
technical journal articles of country i in year t is defined as follows:  
 Articlei,t = ln(1 + Articlei,t) – ln(1 + Articlei,t-1),                                                          (10) 
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where Articlei,t refers to the number of scientific and technical journal articles in physics, 
biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and 
technology, and earth and space sciences from the authors of country i in year t. We obtain the 
data about high-tech exports and scientific and technical journal articles from the WDI/GDF 
database that covers a sample period from 1986 to 2006. 
In Table 6, we report the estimation results of the following models:  
HiTechExporti,t =  + HiTechExporti,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 
+ Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + 
Yeart + ei,t,                           (11) 
Articlei,t =  +  Articlei,t-1 +  MKTi,t-1 +  CREDITi,t-1 +  R&Di,t-1 +  
Turnoveri,t-1 + GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart 
+ ei,t.                                                 (12) 
In Panel A where the dependent variable is HiTechExporti,t, the coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 
are all positive and significant while the coefficient estimates of CREDITi,t-1 range from –0.094 
to –0.071 and are significant in the first two columns. The evidence is consistent with our earlier 
findings that equity market development results in a higher level of high-tech export, while the 
credit capital market development leads to a lower level of high-tech export. In Panel B where 
the dependent variable is Articlei,t, the coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 are all positive and 
significant at the 1%  level in column (1), and the coefficient estimates of CREDITi,t-1 are all 
negative. Overall, our evidence shows that the effect of financial development on innovation is 
reasonably robust to alternative proxies of innovation. 
 
4. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
In this section, we further examine the effect of financial development on innovation by 
making use of cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries’ investor protections and economic 
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development degrees. We discuss how we partition the sample for cross-sectional analysis in 
more details in Appendix C. We report the cross-sectional analysis results based on our baseline 
country-industry-level sample in Table 7 and the cross-sectional analysis results based on the 
country-level sample in Table 8. 
First, we hypothesize that the principal-agent problem may affect the impact of equity 
market development on innovation. This is because public firms’ R&D investment could be 
inefficient or even irrational due to inappropriate internal control or irrational managerial 
optimism (Jensen, 1993; Hall, 1993). Therefore, we expect that the marginal impact of equity 
market development on innovation is stronger in countries where shareholder protection is 
stronger. To test the hypothesis, we partition our sample countries into high shareholder 
protection (High SP) group and low shareholder protection (Low SP) group based on each 
country’s anti-director rights following Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). We run the 
baseline regression separately in these two groups of countries and report the results in the Panel 
A of Table 7. For brevity, we report only the baseline specification with lagged innovation, stock 
market development, credit market development, industry dummies, country dummies, and year 
dummies. However, including other economic variables used in Tables 2 and 5 does not 
substantially change our results.  
The coefficient estimate of MKTi,t-1 is 0.067 and significant at the 1% level in the high SP 
countries and that of MKTi,t-1 is 0.011 but statistically insignificant in the low SP countries. Our 
evidence suggests that the positive effect of stock market development on innovation is stronger 
in the countries with better shareholder protection. The evidence is consistent with the intuition 
that shareholders are more confident at innovation investment when they are better protected, 
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and therefore the impact of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries 
with stronger shareholder protection.  
Based on the similar rationale, we hypothesize that stronger credit rights may make 
creditors less concerned about their investment and wealth and hence mitigate the negative 
impact of credit market development on innovation. To test this hypothesis, we divide our 
sample countries into high creditor protection (High CP) group and low creditor protection (Low 
CP) group based on each country’s creditor rights, following Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 
(2007). We run the baseline regression separately in these two groups of samples and report the 
results in Panel B of Table 7.  
The coefficient estimate of CREDITi,t-1 is negative but not statistically significant in 
countries with high creditor rights, but that of  CREDITi,t-1  is negative and significant at the 1% 
level for the subsample of countries with low creditor rights. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate of CREDITi,t-1 for countries with low creditor rights is much larger than that 
of CREDITi,t-1 for countries with high creditor rights, i.e., –0.204  versus –0.026. Overall, the 
cross-sectional analysis evidence reported above is consistent with the hypothesis that stronger 
shareholder protection magnifies the positive impact of equity market development on 
innovation, while stronger creditor rights mitigates the negative impact of credit market 
development on innovation. 
The third cross-sectional analysis is based on a country’s economic development. Our 
conjecture is that, relative to developed countries, emerging nations may have insufficient capital 
and inefficient investment in its private sector’s technology development. Therefore, the impact 
of equity market development on innovation is stronger in emerging countries. Meanwhile, 
unlike developed economies, the development of credit markets in emerging economies may to 
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some extent reflect the risk aversion of these countries’ investors. Therefore, a more developed 
credit market may discourage risky investment innovation to a greater degree. Hence, the 
negative impact of credit market development on innovation could be stronger in emerging 
countries.  Following Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2009), we classify our sample countries into 
developed and emerging nations. We run the baseline regressions separately in these two 
subsamples and report the regression results in Panel C of Table 7.  
The coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 are both positive and significant at the 1% level 
across the two subsamples. However, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of MKTi,t-1 is 
much larger  for emerging countries relative to that for developed countries (i.e., 0.071 versus 
0.034). The evidence seems to suggest that equity market development contributes to innovation 
to a greater extent in emerging countries than in developed ones, being consistent with our 
hypothesis that, in emerging countries, the private sector’s technology investment is insufficient 
for various reasons, and therefore funds from equity markets become an important source for 
technology investments. The coefficient estimates of CREDITi,t-1 are –0.025 (t-statistic = –1.14) 
and –0.159 (t-statistic = –2.61) in developed and emerging countries, respectively, suggesting 
that the negative effect of credit market development on innovation is more pronounced in 
emerging countries. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that credit market 
development to some extent reflects general risk aversion of investors in emerging countries. 
When investors are more risk averse, a more developed credit market tends to discourage risky 
and idiosyncratic investment (e.g., innovation) to a greater degree. 
For robustness, we redo the cross-sectional analyses based on our country-level sample 
and report the regression results in Table 8. The structure of Table 8 closely mirrors that of Table 
7. Panel A shows the results if the sample is split based on shareholder protection. The 
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coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 are 0.057 (t-statistic = 3.80) and 0.005 (t-statistic = 0.32) in High 
SP and Low SP countries, respectively, being consistent with our findings in Panel A of Table 7 
that the positive effect of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries with 
stronger shareholder protection. In Panel B, we split the sample based on creditor protection. The 
coefficient estimates of CREDITi,t-1 are –0.049 (t-statistic = –0.98) and –0.025 (t-statistic = –
1.91) in High CP and Low CP countries, respectively, being consistent with our findings in Panel 
B of Table 7 that the negative effect of credit market development on innovation is largely 
mitigated in countries with stronger creditor protection.  
When comparing the effect of financial development on innovation in developed to 
emerging countries, we find that, in Panel C, the coefficient estimates of MKTi,t-1 are 0.022 (t-
statistic = 0.94) and 0.033 (t-statistic = 2.77) in developed and emerging countries, respectively, 
and the coefficient estimates of CREDITi,t-1 are 0.081 (t-statistic = 1.28) and –0.022 (t-statistic = 
–0.75) in developed and emerging countries, respectively. The evidence regarding the effect of 
equity market development on innovation across the two groups of countries is consistent with 
our earlier findings, while the results regarding the effect of credit market development on 
innovation are not statistically significant (although the signs of the coefficient estimates are 
consistent with our hypothesis).  
Overall, our evidence collectively suggests the following points. First, the positive effect 
of equity market development on innovation is stronger in countries with better shareholder 
protection, as better protected shareholders are more willing to invest in high-risk-high-return 
innovation. Second, the negative effect of credit market development on innovation is stronger in 
countries with weaker creditor protection, as creditors are more concerned with the risk 
accompanying innovation in these countries. Third, the positive (negative) effect of equity 
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(credit) market development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries, 
suggesting that prevailing under-investment and poor corporate governance in emerging 
countries are obstacles to technological development in these countries.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have provided, for the first time in the literature, cross-country evidence 
that examines how financial market development affects innovation. Making use of a large data 
set that includes 34 developed as well as emerging countries between 1976 and 2006, we report 
the different impacts of equity market and credit market development on a country’s innovation 
growth measured by patenting. Our baseline results suggest that, while the development of 
equity markets encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. We 
conduct a rich set of identification tests and show that our baseline results are robust to 
endogeneity and reverse causality concerns. We further examine the effect of financial 
development on innovation relying on cross-sectional heterogeneity in countries’ investor 
protections and economic development degrees. Our cross-sectional analyses suggest that the 
effect of financial development on innovation is more pronounced in emerging countries and in 
countries with stronger shareholder protection and weaker creditor protection. Our findings are 
robust to alternative measures for innovation, such as high-tech exports and scientific and 
technical journal articles, and alternative measures for financial development.  
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Appendix 
A. Variable definitions 
1. R&Di,t: the natural logarithmic number of country i’s aggregate R&D expenditure in year t 
minus its aggregate R&D expenditure in year t-1, i.e. ln(R&Di,t) – ln(R&Di,t-1). Expenditures 
for research and development are current and capital expenditures (both public and private) on 
creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, including knowledge of 
humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. R&D covers 
basic research, applied research, and experimental development. The data are from the 
WDI/GDF database. 
 
2. Turnoveri,t: the natural logarithmic ratio of country i’s stock market traded value over its stock 
market capitalization in year t. Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during 
the period. This indicator complements the market capitalization ratio by showing whether 
market size is matched by trading. The data are from the WDI/GDF database. 
 
3. GDPi,t: country i’s natural logarithmic GDP in year t minus it’s natural logarithmic GDP in 
year t-1. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar 
figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange 
rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively 
applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. The 
data are from the WDI/GDF database. 
 
4. Opennessi,t: a measure for the economic openness based on export and import, defined as the 
natural logarithmic ratio of country i’s imports plus exports over its GDP in year t, i.e. 
ln[(Importi,t + Exporti,t) / GDPi,t]. Imports of goods and services represent the value of all 
goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. Exports of goods and 
services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world. Both imports and exports include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, 
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, 
construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor services) as well as transfer 
payments. The data are from the WDI/GDF database. 
 
5. M3i,t: a measure of liquid liability, defined as country i’s M3 over its GDP in year t, i.e., 
ln(M3i,t / GDPi,t). They are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus 
transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign 
currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements 
(M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of 
mutual funds or market funds held by residents. The data are from the WDI/GDF database. 
 
6. Freedomi,t: A score for country i’s overall economic freedom score in year t, defined as a 
simple average of its scores on ten individual freedom indexes in year t: business freedom, 
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trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, 
financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. These 
indexes are constructed by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation.  
 
B. Details of dynamic panel data model estimation 
Our dynamic panel regression model can be written as 
,                                                                 
where  is dependent variable, is a vector of explanatory variables (our basic specification 
includes MKTi,t-1, CREDITi,t-1, R&Di,t-1, Turnoveri,t-1, GDPi,t-1, Opennessi,t-1, M3i,t-1, and 
Freedomi,t-1),  is the vector of coefficients associated with explanatory variables,   and   are 
time and individual specific effects, respectively, and  denotes the model errors.   
It is well known that the traditional LSDV (least squares dummy variable) method is 
biased in the above panel autoregressive model with individual effects. To see this, denote the 
time mean of  as 
. 
Simple within-group transformation would show that the strict 
exogeneity condition is violated when regressors include lagged dependent variables: 
 
When the time dimension of the panel data T is small the biases will be very large regardless of 
the number of cross-sections. 
To address this issue, we use the one-step GMM system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) which employs two moment conditions to jointly estimates the 
regressions in transforms of the variables and regressions in levels. We use the past three 
available lagged endogenous variables as instruments in “transformed regressions” and the most 
recent lagged transforms of endogenous variables in “level regressions”.  
Specifically, denoting  our moment conditions for the “transformed 
regressions” are 
 
where 
 
denotes the Kronecker product and 
 
is the residuals from the regressions on variables 
after taking orthogonal deviations,   
 
Our moment conditions for the “level regressions” are 
 
Blundell and Bond (1998) show that GMM system estimator outperforms GMM estimator 
especially when the endogenous variables are persistent (which is especially true for MKT and 
CREDIT). 
 
C. Detailed definitions for subsamples 
1. High shareholder protection (high SP) vs. low shareholder protection (low SP): Using the 
revised Anti-Director index proposed by Spamann (2009) that revises the index of Djankov et 
al. (2008), we classify countries as high (low) SP countries as above (below) the average level 
of the index. The index assigns a value for each country between 1 (poor shareholder rights) 
and 5 (strong shareholder rights). The high SP group includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, and U.K. The low SP group includes Austria, Belgium, 
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China, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.S. 
 
2. High creditor protection (high CP) vs. low creditor protection (low CP): We use the Creditor 
Rights index (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) to classify countries as high (low) CP 
countries as above (below) the average level of the index. The index is constructed at January 
for every year between 1978 and 2003, and covering 133 countries. The creditor rights index 
varies between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). The high CP group 
includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, India, 
Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Singapore, South 
Africa, and U.K. The low CP group includes Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Mexico, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.S. 
 
3. Developed vs. emerging: We follow Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2009) to classify the 
countries as developed countries and emerging countries according to per capita GDP. 
Developed countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., and U.S. Emerging countries include Brazil, 
China, Hungary, India, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, and South Africa. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
The upper panel reports the summary statistics of all variables, while the lower panel reports their correlation 
coefficients. IndustryTechj,i,t is the measure of innovation growth of industry j in country i in year t and is defined as 
ln(1 + Patentj,i,t) – ln(1 + Patentj,i,t-1), where Patentj,i,t  denotes the number of patents in the j-th class of 3-digit patent 
classes filed by the residents of country i to the USPTO in year t. CountryTechi,t is the measure of innovation growth 
of country i in year t and is defined as ln(1 + Patenti,t) – ln(1 + Patenti,t-1), where Patenti,t denotes the number of 
country i residents’ worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with 
country i’s national patent office in year t. MKTi,t is the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP. 
CREDITi,t is the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP. R&Di,t is the logarithmic number 
of country i’s aggregate R&D expenditure in year t divided by its aggregate R&D expenditure in year t-1. Turnoveri,t 
is the logarithmic ratio of country i’s stock market traded value over its stock market capitalization in year t. GDPi,t 
is country i’s logarithmic GDP in year t divided by its logarithmic GDP in year t-1. Opennessi,t is a measure for the 
economic openness based on export and import, defined as the logarithmic ratio of country i’s import plus export over 
its GDP in year t. M3i,t is a measure of liquid liability, defined as the logarithmic value of country i’s M3 over its GDP 
in year t. Freedomi,t is the score for country i’s overall economic freedom score in year t. The p-value of Pearson 
correlation tests are reported in parentheses of the lower panel. The sample period: 1976-2006 for IndustryTechj,i,t, 
1985-2005 for CountryTechi,t, and 1976-2006 for other economic variables. 
 
Variable   Mean   St. dev.   1st auto.   Min.   25%   Med.   75%   Max. 
IndustryTechj,i,t 0.007 0.543 -0.058 -4.407 -0.288 0.000 0.318 3.784 
CountryTechi,t 0.028 0.227 -0.186 -1.099 -0.036 0.015 0.075 3.774 
MKTi,t -0.720 1.204 0.709 -10.102 -1.206 -0.601 0.065 2.201 
CREDITi,t -0.551 0.694 0.948 -2.485 -1.023 -0.413 -0.034 0.838 
R&Di,t 0.047 0.07 0.403 -0.816 0.015 0.046 0.080 0.414 
Turnoveri,t -0.833 1.007 0.670 -5.843 -1.198 -0.725 -0.243 1.828 
GDPi,t 0.038 0.035 0.330 -0.157 0.019 0.036 0.056 0.177 
Opennessi,t -2.648 1.484 0.912 -7.256 -3.426 -2.537 -1.859 1.719 
M3i,t -0.547 0.541 0.871 -2.322 -0.850 -0.579 -0.278 1.030 
Freedomi,t 67.924 10.091 1.024 45.1 61.5 68.2 75.0 90.5 
 
Variable  Pairwise correlation 
CountryTechi,t 1 
 
        
MKTi,t 0.141 
(0.012) 
1 
 
       
CREDITi,t 0.091 
(0.106) 
0.625 
(0.000) 
1       
R&Di,t 0.204 
(0.000) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
0.049 
(0.385) 
1      
Turnoveri,t 0.153 
(0.006) 
0.018 
(0.744) 
0.261 
(0.000) 
0.188 
(0.001) 
1     
GDPi,t 0.192 
(0.001) 
0.213 
(0.000) 
0.034 
(0.545) 
0.553 
(0.000) 
0.247 
(0.000) 
1    
Opennessi,t 0.012 
(0.827) 
0.306 
(0.000) 
0.119 
(0.035) 
0.163 
(0.004) 
-0.038 
(0.496) 
0.139 
(0.013) 
1   
M3i,t 0.129 
(0.022) 
0.539 
(0.000) 
0.819 
(0.000) 
0.147 
(0.009) 
0.251 
(0.000) 
0.145 
(0.010) 
0.217 
(0.000) 
1  
Freedomi,t 0.041 
(0.469) 
0.658 
(0.000) 
0.643 
(0.000) 
0.069 
(0.220) 
0.092 
(0.103) 
-0.067 
(0.234) 
0.439 
(0.000) 
0.554 
(0.000) 
1 
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Table 2 
Financial development and innovation 
This table reports the GMM system estimation results for the following model: IndustryTechj,i,t =   +  
IndustryTechj,i,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-
1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Industryj + Countryi + Yeart + ej,i,t. IndustryTechj,i,t is the measure of 
innovation growth of industry j in country i in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market 
capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over 
GDP, R&Di,t-1 denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, Turnoveri,t-1 denotes the 
logarithmic ratio of stock market traded value over stock market capitalization, GDPi,t-1 denotes the 
difference in logarithmic GDP, Opennessi,t-1 measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic 
ratio of the sum of import and export over GDP, M3i,t-1 is logarithmic ratio of M3 over GDP, Freedomi,t-1  
describes the economic freedom of the country, Industryj denotes industry dummies, Countryi denotes country 
dummies, Yeart  denotes year dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country-industry to draw statistical inferences. The 
sample period is 1976-2006. 
 
 Dependent variable: IndustryTechj,i,t 
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
MKTi,t-1 0.025 0.048 0.045 
                                (1.980) (4.370) (3.137) 
CREDITi,t-1 -0.050 -0.081 -0.059 
                                (-2.129) (-4.518) (-1.748) 
R&Di,t-1  0.162 0.226 
                                 (0.927) (1.525) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.005 -0.007 
                                 (0.502) (-0.619) 
GDPi,t-1  0.684 0.311 
                                 (1.927) (1.006) 
Opennessi,t-1   0.045 
                                  (5.674) 
M3i,t-1   0.102 
                                  (5.822) 
Freedomi,t-1   0.004 
                                  (2.702) 
IndustryTechj,i,t-1 0.099 0.021 0.000 
                                (2.854) (0.687) (0.012) 
 
0.067 0.059 -0.063 
                                (4.402) (2.298) (-0.484) 
Industry dummy                 Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy                  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy                     Yes Yes Yes 
R2                          0.104 0.174 0.216 
Observation                     61,907 50,906 32,375 
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Table 3 
Reverse causality 
This table reports the GMM system estimation results. Panel A estimates the following model: MKTi,t  =   + 
CountryTechi,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-
1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. Panel B estimates the following model: CREDITi,t  =   
+ CountryTechi,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ 
Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. CountryTechi,t is the measure of 
innovation growth of country i in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization 
over GDP, CREDITi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, R&Di,t-1 
denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, Turnoveri,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of 
stock market traded value over stock market capitalization, GDPi,t-1 denotes the difference in logarithmic 
GDP, Opennessi,t-1 measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of 
import and export over GDP, M3i,t-1 is logarithmic ratio of M3 over GDP, Freedomi,t-1  describes the economic 
freedom of the country, Countryi  denotes country dummies, Yeart  denotes year dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the 
error term. We use one-step estimators and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country to 
draw statistical inferences. The sample period is 1985-2005. 
 
Panel A MKTi,t Panel B CREDITi,t 
          (1) (2) (3)            (1) (2) (3) 
CountryTechi,t-1 -0.016 -0.030 -0.037 CountryTechi,t-1 -0.048 -0.027 -0.033 
 (-0.264) (-0.636) (-0.612)  (-1.331) (-0.953) (-0.855) 
MKTi,t-1 0.663 0.699 0.704 MKTi,t-1 0.030 0.043 0.047 
                                (10.209) (7.641) (9.482)                                 (4.778) (2.666) (3.797) 
CREDITi,t-1 0.108 0.065 -0.083 CREDITi,t-1 0.919 0.914 0.920 
                                (2.048) (1.016) (-1.135)                                 (39.933) (31.688) (42.785) 
R&Di,t-1  0.592 0.641 R&Di,t-1  0.050 -0.020 
                                 (1.662) (1.480)                                  (0.373) (-0.132) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.040 0.103 Turnoveri,t-1  0.015 0.022 
                                 (0.932) (1.471)                                  (1.246) (1.728) 
GDPi,t-1  -2.453 -3.409 GDPi,t-1  0.362 0.542 
                                 (-1.796) (-2.040)                                  (0.818) (1.083) 
Opennessi,t-1   0.041 Opennessi,t-1   -0.008 
                                  (1.318)                                   (-0.563) 
M3i,t-1   0.124 M3i,t-1   -0.077 
                                  (1.539)                                   (-2.029) 
Freedomi,t-1   0.010 Freedomi,t-1   0.004 
                                  (2.247)                                   (2.722) 
 
-0.167 -0.063 -0.485 
 
0.074 0.084 -0.230 
                                (-1.959) (-0.584) (-1.172)                               (3.832) (1.822) (-1.884) 
Country dummy                  Yes Yes Yes  Country dummy               Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy                     Yes Yes Yes  Year dummy                  Yes Yes Yes 
R2                          0.876 0.869 0.879 R2                          0.956 0.956 0.958 
Observation                    501 497 317  Observation                 494 490 315 
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Table 4 
Two-stage least squares regression results 
This table reports the results of two-stage least squares regressions with legal origins and religious 
compositions as instrumental variables. Legal origins include English, French, German, and Scandinavian 
systems. Religious compositions are fractions of Catholics, Muslims, and Protestants. In the first-stage 
regressions, we regress MKTi or CREDITi on IVs as well as other control variables, where MKTi and CREDITi 
denote the time series averages of the logarithmic ratios of stock market capitalization and domestic credit to 
private sectors over GDP, respectively. F stat. presents the significance of IVs in the first-stage regressions, 
and the null hypothesis is that the existence of IVs is insignificant in the first-stage regressions (p-values are 
reported in brackets). In the second-stage regressions, we regress IndustryTechj,i on the predicted MKTi and 
CREDITi and other control variables, where IndustryTechj,i denotes the time series average of 
IndustryTechj,i,t. All control variables are the time series averages of the control variables used in Table 2. 
The null hypothesis for the Sargan-Hansen J-statistics is that the considered IVs are valid (p-values are 
reported in brackets). We use the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country-industry to 
draw statistical inferences. The sample period is 1976-2006. 
Country-industry cross-section 
 (1) (2) (3) 
1st-stage regressions    
F stat. (MKTi)             547.3 416 431.3 
                                [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
F stat. (CREDITi)          764.7 502.3 274.3 
                                [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2nd-stage regressions    
MKTi 0.009 0.008 0.007 
                                (2.961) (3.255) (2.103) 
CREDITi -0.000 -0.000 -0.015 
                                (-0.037) (-0.122) (-1.644) 
R&Di  0.022 0.019 
                                 (2.046) (1.688) 
Turnoveri  0.005 0.007 
                                 (2.663) (3.115) 
GDPi  0.099 0.078 
                                 (1.890) (1.377) 
Opennessi   -0.001 
                                  (-0.942) 
M3i   0.008 
                                  (1.331) 
Freedomi   0.000 
                                  (1.010) 
 
0.013 0.011 -0.005 
                                (7.147) (4.239) (-0.294) 
J stat. (validity)              10.69 7.22 7.73 
                                [0.058] [0.205] [0.172] 
R2     0.005 0.018 0.017 
Observation                    7,133 5,847 5,781 
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Table 5  
Financial development and innovation: Country-level panel 
This table reports the GMM system estimation results for the following model: CountryTechi,t =  + 
CountryTechi,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + Turnoveri,t-1 +  GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-
1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. CountryTechi,t is the measure of innovation growth of 
country i in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t-1 
denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, R&Di,t-1 denotes the difference 
in logarithmic aggregate R&D expenditure, Turnoveri,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market traded 
value over stock market capitalization, GDPi,t-1 denotes the difference in logarithmic GDP, Opennessi,t-1 
measures the economic openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of import and export over 
GDP, M3i,t-1 is logarithmic ratio of M3 over GDP, Freedomi,t-1  describes the economic freedom of the country, 
Countryi denotes country dummies, Yeart  denotes year dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-
step estimators and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country to draw statistical 
inferences. The sample period is 1985-2005. 
 
 Dependent variable: CountryTechi,t 
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
MKTi,t-1 0.046 0.033 0.028 
                                (3.584) (2.051) (2.057) 
CREDITi,t-1 -0.035 -0.049 -0.047 
                                (-1.632) (-1.688) (-2.402) 
R&Di,t-1  0.182 0.126 
                                 (0.838) (0.516) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.042 0.023 
                                 (1.887) (1.593) 
GDPi,t-1  0.559 0.848 
                                 (1.673) (2.083) 
Opennessi,t-1   -0.006 
                                  (-0.522) 
M3i,t-1   0.053 
                                  (1.613) 
Freedomi,t-1   -0.001 
                                  (-0.304) 
CountryTechi,t-1 -0.266 -0.271 -0.277 
                                (-1.658) (-2.037) (-1.969) 
 
0.075 0.081 0.087 
                              (3.064) (1.870) (0.593) 
                                  
 Country dummy               Yes Yes Yes 
 Year dummy                  Yes Yes Yes 
 R2                          0.01 0.081 0.144 
 Observation                  461 457 293 
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Table 6  
Financial development and innovation: Alternative innovation proxies 
This table reports the GMM system estimation results. Panel A estimates the following model: 
HiTechExporti,t =  + HiTechExporti,t-1 + MKTi,t-1 + CREDITi,t-1 + R&Di,t-1 + Turnoveri,t-1 +  
GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. Panel B estimates the following 
model: Articlei,t =  +  Articlei,t-1 +  MKTi,t-1 +  CREDITi,t-1 +  R&Di,t-1 +  Turnoveri,t-1 + 
GDPi,t-1+ Opennessi,t-1+ M3i,t-1 + Freedomi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. HiTechExporti,t denotes the 
logarithmic growth of country i’s high-tech export value in year t, while Articlei,t denotes the logarithmic 
growth in the number of country i’s scientific and technical journal articles in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the 
logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of 
domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, R&Di,t-1 denotes the difference in logarithmic aggregate R&D 
expenditure, Turnoveri,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market traded value over stock market 
capitalization, GDPi,t-1 denotes the difference in logarithmic GDP, Opennessi,t-1 measures the economic 
openness and is defined as the logarithmic ratio of the sum of import and export over GDP, M3i,t-1 is 
logarithmic ratio of M3 over GDP, Freedomi,t-1  describes the economic freedom of the country, Countryi 
denotes country dummies, Yeart  denotes year dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step 
estimators and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country to draw statistical inferences. The 
sample period is 1986-2006. 
 
Panel A HiTechExporti,t Panel B Articlei,t 
          (1) (2) (3)            (1) (2) (3) 
MKTi,t-1 0.049 0.039 0.058 MKTi,t-1 0.015 0.004 0.009 
                                (1.845) (1.615) (2.193)                                 (2.953) (0.636) (1.420) 
CREDITi,t-1 -0.094 -0.078 -0.071 CREDITi,t-1 -0.012 0.018 -0.014 
                                (-3.326) (-2.526) (-1.379)                                 (-0.749) (1.124) (-1.638) 
R&Di,t-1  -0.029 -0.033 R&Di,t-1  0.178 0.105 
                                 (-0.193) (-0.182)                                  (3.626) (2.931) 
Turnoveri,t-1  0.006 0.015 Turnoveri,t-1  -0.009 0.011 
                                 (0.356) (0.756)                                  (-1.050) (2.535) 
GDPi,t-1  -0.293 -0.275 GDPi,t-1  0.056 -0.121 
                                 (-0.942) (-0.757)                                  (0.316) (-0.925) 
Opennessi,t-1   0.014 Opennessi,t-1   0.000 
                                  (1.018)                                   (0.009) 
M3i,t-1   0.007 M3i,t-1   0.019 
                                  (0.118)                                   (1.221) 
Freedomi,t-1   -0.004 Freedomi,t-1   -0.000 
                                  (-1.826)                                   (-0.516) 
HiTechExporti,t-1 -0.036 -0.033 -0.038 Articlei,t-1 0.013 -0.197 0.197 
                                (-0.824) (-0.770) (-0.758)                                 (0.259) (-1.369) (1.787) 
 
0.000 0.217 0.537 
 
0.000 0.094 0.143 
                                (3.881) (4.954) (2.586)                               (4.799) (4.375) (1.861) 
Country dummy                  Yes Yes Yes  Country dummy               Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy                     Yes Yes Yes  Year dummy                  Yes Yes Yes 
R2                          0.151 0.159 0.179 R2                          0.074 0.049 0.291 
Observation                    508 506 331  Observation                 535 531 336 
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Table 7 
Cross-sectional analysis: Country-industry-level panel 
In Panel A, we divide all country-industry-year samples into two groups: High shareholder protection (High SP) and 
low shareholder protection (Low SP). In Panel B, we divide all samples into two groups: High creditor protection 
(High CP) and low creditor protection (Low CP). In Panel C, we divide all samples into two groups: Developed and 
emerging.  Within each group, we estimate the following model: IndustryTechj,i,t =   +  IndustryTechj,i,t-1 +  
MKTi,t-1 +  CREDITi,t-1 + Industryj + Countryi + Yeart + ej,i,t. IndustryTechj,i,t is the measure of innovation growth 
of industry j in country i in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, 
CREDITi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, Industryj denotes industry 
dummies, Countryi denotes country dummies, Yeart  denotes year dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the error term. We use 
one-step estimators and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by country-industry to draw statistical 
inferences.  The sample period is 1976-2006. 
 
 A. Shareholder protection (SP) B. Creditor protection (CP) 
          High SP Low SP High CP Low CP 
MKTi,t-1 0.067 0.011 0.049 0.016 
                                (4.442) (0.635) (3.605) (0.904) 
CREDITi,t-1 -0.037 -0.196 -0.026 -0.204 
                                (-1.766) (-5.931) (-1.277) (-6.471) 
IndustryTechj,i,t-1 0.163 0.015 0.094 0.071 
                                (3.056) (0.373) (2.133) (1.425) 
 
0.105 0.025 0.111 0.024 
                                (5.240) (1.115) (5.889) (1.109) 
Industry dummy                  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy                  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy                     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                          0.027 0.161 0.105 0.107 
Observation                    25,755 36,152 30,078 31,829 
 C. Developed vs. emerging  
          Developed Emerging   
MKTi,t-1 0.034 0.071   
                                (2.800) (2.517)   
CREDITi,t-1 -0.025 -0.159   
                                (-1.139) (-2.614)   
IndustryTechj,i,t-1 0.057 0.163   
                                (1.657) (2.003)   
 
0.075 0.208   
                                (5.088) (2.539)   
Industry dummy                  Yes Yes   
Country dummy                  Yes Yes   
Year dummy                     Yes Yes   
R2                          0.137 0.007   
Observation                    55,774 6,133   
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Table 8 
 Cross-sectional analysis: Country-level panel 
In Panel A, we divide all country-year samples into two groups: High shareholder protection (High SP) 
and low shareholder protection (Low SP). In Panel B, we divide all samples into two groups: High 
creditor protection (High CP) and low creditor protection (Low CP). In Panel C, we divide all samples 
into two groups: Developed and emerging.  Within each group, we estimate the following model: 
CountryTechi,t =  +  CountryTechi,t-1 +  MKTi,t-1 +  CREDITi,t-1 + Countryi  + Yeart + ei,t. 
CountryTechi,i,t is the measure of innovation growth of country i in year t. MKTi,t-1 denotes the 
logarithmic ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP, CREDITi,t-1 denotes the logarithmic ratio of 
domestic credit to private sectors over GDP, Countryi denotes country dummies, Yeart  denotes year 
dummies, and ej,i,t denotes the error term. We use one-step estimators and heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by country to draw statistical inferences. The sample period is 1985-2005. 
 
 A. Shareholder protection (SP) B. Creditor protection (CP) 
          High SP Low SP High CP Low CP 
MKTi,t-1 0.057 0.005 0.058 0.031 
                                (3.799) (0.323) (2.839) (3.729) 
CREDITi,t-1 -0.042 -0.009 -0.049 -0.025 
                                (-1.434) (-0.391) (-0.980) (-1.912) 
CountryTechi,t-1 -0.330 0.027 -0.309 0.071 
                                (-2.473) (0.249) (-2.257) (0.885) 
 
0.094 0.022 0.102 0.073 
                                (3.119) (0.802) (2.750) (3.828) 
Country dummy                  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy                     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                          0.105 0.069 0.014 0.213 
Observation                    239 222 294 159 
 C. Developed vs. emerging  
          Developed Emerging   
MKTi,t-1 0.022 0.033   
                                (0.941) (2.773)   
CREDITi,t-1 0.081 -0.022   
                                (1.277) (-0.746)   
CountryTechi,t-1 -0.420 0.136   
                                (-5.065) (1.374)   
 
0.066 0.108   
                                (1.556) (3.381)   
Country dummy          Yes Yes   
Year dummy                     Yes Yes   
R2                          0.099 0.183   
Observation                    315 146   
 
 
